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Abstract
We present the Maestro Attack, a Link Flooding Attack (LFA) that leverages Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) traffic engineering techniques to improve the flow density of botnet-
sourced Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) on transit links. Specific-prefix routes poisoned
for certain Autonomous Systems (ASes) are advertised by a compromised network operator
to channel bot-to-bot flows over a target link. Publicly available AS relationship data feeds
a greedy heuristic that iteratively builds a poison set of ASes to perform the attack.
Given a compromised BGP speaker with advantageous positioning relative to the target
link in the Internet topology, an adversary can expect to enhance flow density by more than
30 percent. For a large botnet (e.g., Mirai), the bottom line result is augmenting the DDoS
by more than a million additional infected hosts. Interestingly, the size of the adversary-
controlled AS plays little role in this effect; attacks on large core links can be effected by
small, resource-limited ASes.
Link vulnerability is evaluated across several metrics, including BGP betweenness and
botnet flow density, and we assess where an adversary must be positioned to execute the
attack most successfully. Mitigations are presented for network operators seeking to insulate
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Adversaries are exploiting long-known vulnerabilities in the Internet’s routing architecture
to launch increasingly sophisticated control-plane attacks. In 2014, security researchers
discovered that a Canadian ISP surreptitiously hijacked bitcoin mining related traffic to
steal victim miners’ computational work, netting over $80,000 [27]. On an even larger scale,
fraudulent networks designed to deceive advertisers into paying for automated ad views have
raked in multimillion dollar hauls [45]. One such opeation, 3ve, persisted for years and raked
in nearly $30 million [14].
The security industry partnership that eventually unravelled 3ve marvelled at its technical
difficulty and professional execution - at its height, the operators were concurrently managing
three distinct fraud operations. It is relevant to note that 3ve’s operators registered their
own Internet-level networks, or Autonomous Systems (ASes), and demonstrated a thorough
technical knowledge of how to exploit this privileged position on the Internet. While a
detailed analysis of 3ve is beyond the scope of this work, it is sufficient to note that steps
taken to disguise 3ve - e.g. the seizure of derelict ASes to serve as pretend customers for the
operators’ AS - were effective in slowing its detection.
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks are another scourge of the Internet. In
short, these attacks direct traffic from many points on the Internet to a target or targets,
in an effort to overwhelm the capacity of links or end hosts. As shown in Fig 1.1, hundreds
of these attacks are launched every day. Sources for these flows are only growing more
plentiful over time as the number of devices and services on the Internet expands. The
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Figure 1.1: DDoS attacks in Q4 2018 [21]
billions of devices connected by the Internet of Things, for example, are already fueling
DDoS attacks [23]. The development and adoption of novel Internet services is another
source of potential attack flows. Unprotected memcached servers were recently used in a
reflection attack that temporarily took Github offline [29].
Unfortunately, the Internet is not well-positioned to respond to this growing threat. The
simplest and perhaps most effective response to volumetric DDoS is paying for mitigation
services that, in general, divert traffic into a robust infrastructure to maintain availability
for the purchaser during attack analysis/response [17]. This and other currently deployed
solutions are ineffective in the face of more sophisticated methods that target infrastructure
links rather than an end host, called Link Flooding Attacks (LFAs) [20, 41]. These novel
attacks may have crossed from academic possibility to present threat: a 2016 Mirai attack
directed over 500 Gbps attack to a provider in Liberia in what may have been an early
attempt to execute an LFA [37].
We will demonstrate that Link Flooding Attacks (LFAs) are limited by
Internet routing characteristics, and that these limitations can be partially
defeated by a routing capable adversary. Our novel attack, Maestro, arises from the
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confluence of the routing exploits and DDoS techniques presented in this section. Maestro
allows an adversary with large traffic flows (from botnets or other sources) to channel them
onto a target link with unprecedented control. If critical transit links in the dense core of the
Internet are targeted, a strategy introduced in prior work [41], this attack could create broad
disruption affecting thousands of peripheral networks served by the link. We will propose
effective mitigations to prevent such an attack, and share insight into promising avenues for
future work.
Our major contributions are as follows:
• Measure how Internet routing properties limit Link Flooding Attacks. These
initial experiments motivate our attack, and are presented below in Section 1.1.
• Develop a technique to overcome these limitations: The Maestro Attack.
We will demonstrate how traffic engineering techniques can be employed to increase
the portion of an adversary’s botnet that can attack a target link in Section 3. This
effectively amplifies Link Flooding Attacks for already-vulnerable links and extends a
botmaster’s reach to new targets.
• Evaluate our new attack via simulated attacks on Internet links. We extend
the Chaos BGP simulator (see Section 3.4) to execute thousands of attacks on links in
a simulated Internet topology, varying target link selection and the adversary’s relative
position and quantifying our level of success. The results of these attacks are presented
in Section 4.
• Explore the relationship between link vulnerability and adversary position.
We summarize in Section 6 the insights we have derived from our experiments regarding
where adversaries should be positioned for maximum effect on a target link.
1.1 Betweeenness and Link Flooding Limitations
Our first experiment is designed to illustrate the critical nature of select core Internet links
by examining their relative usage. For this purpose, we classify links by betweenness,
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defined as the number of times a link appears on the currently-used (best) path between
any pair of ASes. High betweenness indicates that a link is used for transit between many
ASes; a low betwenness link, on the other hand, serves relatively few ASes. Figure 1.2
shows the distribution of Internet links by betweenness, based on CAIDA’s AS relationship
inference [3] and the Chaos BGP simulator (see Section 3.4). The majority of links appear
on 10 or fewer paths, indicating they are little used or peripherally located. But select
links have a betweenness of more than 1 million, providing connectivity between more than
1,000 AS source/destination pairs. Attacks on these critical links would play havoc with
upstream/downstream networks, and could potentially threaten entire regions (as in the
Liberia attack).
We observe that prior work on LFAs often 1) do not perform their measurements with
distribution data from a real botnet [20], 2) assume botnets can direct significant flows over
arbitrary links on the Internet [43], or 3) choose specific links based on botnet flows [41, 36].
We quantify link vulnerability via flow density, defined for now as the percentage of a botnet’s
infected hosts with paths to another bot over the target link. This metric is based on a
Coremelt-style attack, where n bots generate n2 flows by sending traffic to one another, a
technique that makes attack flows appear “wanted” by the receiver and therefore increases
the difficulty in distinguishing them from normal traffic (see Section 2.3.1).
Figure 1.3 depicts the results of our second experiment, measuring botnet flow density
as a function of betweenness for all links in the inferred Internet topology. Note that
some low betweenness (peripheral) links are, not unexpectedly, wholly outside the reach
of this kind of attack. Critically, some moderate to high betweenness (core) links
are also partially or completely absent from paths between bots. We note that
relaxing our attack technique by allowing bots to send traffic to any AS destination does
not significantly alleviate these limitations, as shown in Figure 1.4. In Section 3 we will
introduce the Maestro Attack, a novel method of combining traffic engineering techniques
with Link Flooding Attacks in an attempt to increase the flow density a botmaster can bring
on to target links. First, however, we must provide some essential background information
on Internet routing and LFAs.
4
Figure 1.2: Betweenness of Internet links based on CAIDA inferred
topology [3].
5
Figure 1.3: Flow density by betweenness.
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Here we briefly describe the Internet’s routing architecture and traffic engineering techniques
to provide necessary context for our attack.
2.1 The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
While the Internet is most precisely described as a global network of interconnected routers,
we can view it more abstractly as the composition of about 60,000 Autonomous Systems
- or ASes - and their connections to one another. Each AS is a network of routers under
singular administrative control [15] with a unique assigned identifier (an ASN ). ASes exist
to route traffic (in the form of IP packets) internally between hosts within the network and
externally to other ASes. Each AS is directly connected to some number of other ASes as
a peer, customer, or provider. A customer-provider relationship exists when one AS (the
customer) compensates the other (the provider) to transit its traffic to/from the rest of the
Internet. ASes in a peering relationship have agreed to a mutually beneficial relationship
where traffic can be exchanged between them without compensation. To provide connectivity
to their hosts, ASes assign IP addresses from their allocated blocks of IP addresses, called
prefixes.
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the common language ASes use to communicate.
BGP routes are defined by a destination IP prefix and a collection of attributes. Most
notable among these attributes is the AS PATH, a sequence of ASNs describing the AS-level
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hops along the path to the destination prefix. ASes originate routes to IP prefixes under
their control and advertise them to the rest of the Internet via their neighboring ASes (see
Figure 2.1). An AS’s routers store all paths they learn about for one of the most important
functions of BGP, the decision process. The decision process guides how routers select a
best path to a destination prefix from all the routes they have been advertised. Importantly,
routers will first filter out infeasible paths, including any route that contains their own ASN
in the AS PATH. This provides BGP with a loop-detection mechanism. We will discuss later
how this mechanism can be leveraged to selectively prevent route installation.
Feasible routes to the prefix are scored on their attributes, most notably AS PATH length
and LOCAL PREF. LOCAL PREF is used to indicate the AS operator’s level of preference
for a path, informed by local policy choices regarding path qualities like desired next hops,
and holds precedence over AS PATH length in the decision process. Shorter AS PATH length
is used to break ties for paths with equal LOCAL PREF. Because the BGP decision process
draws on path and policy attributes in route selection, it is categorized as a path-vector
algorithm with policies. Upon receiving a packet, an AS’s routers will compare the packet’s
destination IP to the prefixes for which it has installed a best path. The longest prefix
matching rule dictates that the stored path with the longest (most specific) prefix match
will be used to forward the packet to its next hop.
Once an AS selects a best path, it makes a propagation choice driven by economic
incentive. If the path was learned about (and therefore leads through) a customer, the
AS will propagate the routes onward to all direct connections to facilitate their customers’
connectivity and increase their own compensation. Before advertising the route, the provider
prepends their own ASN to the AS PATH, effectively extending the route to include
themselves. Peers who receive a route advertisement will likewise prepend their ASN and
forward it onward, but only to their customers, as they are not incentivized to provide transit
to their peers or providers to the newly learned route. These route propagation behaviors
shape the way paths are formed as they spread through the AS topology; the term [12].
Valley-free routing means that, in general, we expect that routes will never transit from a
customer to a provider after transiting from a provider to a customer. An AS’s customer
9
Figure 2.1: BGP routes built iteratively as they are propagated by
neighboring ASes. Since 4 chooses path {2, 1} to reach 1, path {1, 3,
4} is not exported.
cone, defined as the set of all ASes reachable from an AS via only customer links, therefore
have the highest visibility of routes advertised by the AS.
2.2 BGP Poisoning
As discussed in the previous section, the BGP decision process gives local operators control
over (at minimum) the next hop outbound packets will take for any given prefix destination.
Additionally, assuming compliant routing behavior, and ignoring short term disruptions
caused by path changes along routes, the entire preferred outbound path can be selected.
Unfortunately, BGP allows for relatively little control over the paths of inbound traffic. Some
techniques do exist for engineering inbound flows, including the MULTI EXIT DISC (exit
discriminator) attribute [30], BGP communities [11], and AS PATH or destination prefix
manipulation, but all are subject to the traffic source AS’s policy.
BGP poisoning is a traffic engineering primitive that allows for the manipulation of an
AS’s inbound traffic routes without coordination from other ASes [40]. BGP poisoning relies
on two characteristics of BGP: loop detection and longest-prefix matching. An illustration
of BGP poisoning is shown in Figure 2.3. The advertising or poisoning AS advertises a more
10
Figure 2.2: Valley free routing: ASes inform customers of all paths,
but do not transit traffic for providers.
specific (longer) prefix for the traffic it wishes to move. As an example, Fig 2.3 depicts
AS 1 advertising a longer /24 prefix compared to the /17 in Figure 2.1. Longest-prefix
matching means that ASes directing traffic to the IPs within the prefix will switch on to
the new route (see AS 2). However, an AS or set of ASes are included in the AS PATH
for the advertisement, sandwitched between copies of the originator’s ASN (in this case, 1).
Because they are on the AS PATH, these ASes are poisoned ; that is, they will detect a loop
and drop the advertisement. Note that these ASes still have connectivity to the advertising
AS’s other prefixes. However, they do not have a path to the more specific prefix, and their
traffic flows are unchanged by the advertisement.
2.3 Botnets and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) is the term used to describe a network attack sourced
from multiple, coordinated hosts. In this work, we will only discuss the most brutally
straightforward form of DDoS: volumetric DDoS (Fig 2.4). Traditionally, a volumetric DDoS
simply requires that the attacker pour more traffic into a host or service than the target can
withstand. The result is a partial or total degradation of the network service until the
attack can be mitigated. These attacks are more than a nuisance - they are employed in
11
Figure 2.3: BGP poisoning. AS 1 advertises a specific prefix
(thicker arrow). AS 4’s traffic to AS 1 (blue) is moved to the more
specific route. AS 2 is said to have been poisoned.
nation-state level attacks [5, 16] and can isolate or degrade Internet performance for large
geographic regions [1].
Often the traffic source for these attacks are botnets, which are networks of compromised
end hosts (bots) under an attacker’s control. Because these networks are often large and
well dispersed among many ASes, their small per-bot flows are difficult to filter/classify,
but their aggregate traffic volume can be devastating [1]. We analyze our attack using
three different botnet families, classified by the malware used to infect/control bots, each
with distinct characteristics. The Mirai worm was one of the first to infect Internet of
Things devices [23]. These small, resource-constrained hosts are generally poorly secured and
plentiful, allowing Mirai-based networks to generate flows greater than 1Tpbs [1]. Conficker is
an older, more traditional worm targeting Windows machines with advanced self-propagation
mechanisms that has infected millions of victims [38]. Blackenergy botnets are based on
malware developed and primarily distributed in Eastern Europe, often spread via infected
Microsoft Office documents. In 2015, a Blackenergy botnet was used to launch a power grid
attack in Ukraine that resulted in outages for over 200,000 consumers [5].
2.3.1 Link Flooding Attacks
A more recent class of DDoS attacks, Link Flooding Attacks (LFAs), targets network
infrastructure rather than end hosts. One of the first such attacks in the literature is
12
Figure 2.4: DDoS: a botnet with infected hosts in multiple ASes
launches an attack against the Target AS. Bot traffic (red)
overwhelms normal traffic to the target, which is lost.
Coremelt [41]. To execute a Coremelt attack, bots in a botnet 1) map which links are
present on paths on routes between them, 2) target a specific link used on paths between
many bots, and 3) direct bot traffic to other bots over the link. The resulting n2 flows (for n
bots with paths over the link) overwhelms benign traffic on the target link. The bot traffic
is especially difficult to classify/filter as it is “wanted” by the destination host and therefore
appears legitimate.
The Crossfire attack, like Coremelt, targets links in the Internet topology, but has the
more ambitious goal of isolating an entire region (military installation, university, geographic
region, etc) [20]. Rather than directing traffic to one another, bots map paths to publicly
available web services (decoys) that result nevertheless in flows transiting target links. Bots
use sustained, low-intensity flows to these services to execute the attack, a pattern that
makes Crossfire extremely difficult to detect and counter.
13
(a) Core transit link carries traffic between ASes
(b) Botnet flows congest link




3.1 The Maestro Attack
As discussed in Section 2.1, BGP allows network operators to apply their own policies to
select outbound routes for any given destination prefix. Hosts within an AS (including
bots) have no such control; their traffic follows routes chosen by the network operator. This
limits choice of targets for a Link Flooding Attack (LFA), because bots cannot always find
a destination for their traffic that crosses an arbitrary link on the Internet (see Section 1.1).
The result is that very few links can be hit with the full force of a distributed botnet, and
many cannot be affected at all.
The central insight of the Maestro attack is that while an adversary cannot fully dictate
outbound bot traffic paths, a routing-capable adversary can use BGP poisoning to alter
inbound paths to themselves. If an adversary first directs bot traffic to the AS/prefix under
adversarial control (the compromised AS or adversary AS ), they can then orchestrate those
flows onto a target link using BGP (like a conductor, or maestro). We call the origin endpoint
of the target link the from AS and destination endpoint of the target link the to AS. Note
that the adversary cannot influence the route selection process in the ASes housing the bots;
rather, BGP poisoning essentially bypasses route selection by presenting a more specific
prefix than infected ASes have previously seen.
In effect, this also executes a traditional DDoS against the adversary AS. As discussed
in Section 3.2, however, this may be of little concern to a motivated attacker. They may
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have compromised or registered an AS for this very purpose, and/or have calculated that
the temporary disruption to their own AS is worth degrading the target link. We will show
that, given certain topological relationships between the compromised AS and target link,
the adversary can expect a significant improvement in flow density on the target.
3.2 Threat Model
To execute this attack, an adversary requires 1) command of a botnet and 2) control of
a BGP speaker, i.e., a router on the edge of an AS. The first item is trivially obtainable,
as botmasters routinely monetize their networks by renting them out in an attack-as-a-
service model on the dark web [32]. Recent events demonstrate that there are, unfortunately,
multiple feasible avenues for malicious parties to achieve routing capability. The 3ve fraud
operation [14], discussed in Section 1, demonstrates the most straightforward route - simply
registering an AS. Network operators could also be hacked or compromised by an insider,
as may have been in the case in the Canadian bitcoin hijack [27]. Finally, BGP has already
been weaponized for intelligence gathering [10] and censorship [9] by nation states. While
these more powerful adversaries have many tools at their disposal, they certainly have the
leverage to execute the Maestro attack.
3.3 Algorithm
One core capability for the attacker is an algorithm to determine which ASes to poison to
maximize inbound bot traffic over the target link. We call this set of ASes the poison set.
These are ASes that will be sandwitched between the compromised ASN in the poisoned
advertisement (see Section 2.2). Finding a poison set that successfully steers bot traffic is
no trivial task, because poison sets are conflicting ; that is, the poisons required to steer one
bot-containing AS (or source AS onto the target link will disconnect 1) the poison set and 2)
all ASes without a path to the poisoning prefix that does not transit the poison set. Also, we
cannot precisely predict AS behavior; our expectations for how ASes will respond to poisons
16
are therefore based on inferred AS relationships from CAIDA [3] and the Chaos simulator
(see 3.4.
3.3.1 Optimal Poison Choice
We can solve for the optimal poison set by re-framing the problem as MAX-SAT, a
generalization of boolean satisfiability (SAT) where we seek to assign truth values to variables
in order to maximize the number of satisfied clauses rather than achieve complete boolean
formula satisfaction [44]. Consider that each source AS has a set of poison sets S that map to
resulting paths P over the target link to the adversary AS, where each set s ∈ S corresponds
to a resulting path to the poisoning prefix p ∈ P (that is, s 7→ p for that source AS). This
signifies that if the adversary chooses a poison set that contains all of the ASes in s and
none of the ASes in p, the source AS will shift onto path p. Note that, depending on the
adversary AS and target link position relative to the source AS, S and P may be empty; in
that case, there is no way to steer the source AS onto the target link.
In our boolean formula, the variables will be the ASes in the topology. We can define
the structure of the boolean formula by building a clause for each source AS thusly: an
AS appearing in a poison s is represented by its AS variable, and the ASes in the resulting
path p are represented by the inversion of their AS variables. These variables are joined
conjunctively, along with the source AS itself; if it is poisoned, it will of course not have a
path to the poisoned prefix. We disjunctively join each source AS’s conjunctive clauses, one
for each s 7→ p, to form a clause in disjunctively normal form for that source AS. This clause
is the boolean representation of the poison choices we must make to bring the source AS
onto the target link.
Finally, we join the all source AS clauses by conjunction, and we have defined a boolean
formula that describes how our poison choices will affect the paths of ASes containing bots
to the adversary. While we do not reformulate the problem in conjunctive normal form, it
is always possible to do so [18].
Unfortunately, MAX SAT is APX-complete; no efficient algorithm can solve it, and
no polynomial time approximation scheme can be devised (unless P = NP ) [7]. This is
problematic because exploring how the relative topological position of the adversary, target,
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and flow sources requires the simulation of thousands of attacks. To enable this, we designed
an efficient heuristic that exploits the specific structure of our problem.
3.3.2 Iterative Poison Choice Heuristic
We begin from the observation that despite the high runtime complexity of the problem,
the adversary’s goal is simple: selectively poison ASes on source AS paths to the adversary
that do not cross the target link in an attempt to force source ASes to switch onto paths
that do contain the target link. Intuitively, the adversary wants to form a bottleneck to the
poisoning prefix over the target link.
Our poison choice heuristic (Algorithm 3.3.2) represents one of our major contributions.
The algorithm works by first establishing a set of sacred ASes that should never be poisoned.
This set is initialized with the from AS, the to AS, the compromised AS, and all ASes that
appear on every path from the to AS to the compromised AS (naturally, we must have a
path for traffic from the target link to the compromised AS). We will then iteratively build
the poison set.
At each iteration, we 1) select an AS to poison from the source ASes that remain
(i.e. those not already poisoned, disconnected by poisons, or marked sacred), 2) add it
to the poison set, 3) measure the simulated response of source ASes to the new poison
set, and 4) update the sacred set. We will terminate iteration when all ASes are either
poisoned/disconnected from the poisoned prefix, successfully transiting the target link to
the poisoned prefix, or marked sacred. An additional termination condition is reached if the
poison set (which is included in the AS PATH as described in Section 2.2) causes the AS
PATH to exceed the size AS operators will almost certainly filter in practice: around 254
hops [43, 40].
3.3.3 Example Attack
To further elucidate our heuristic, we present an example attack on a small toy topology in
Fig 3.1. ASes above (closer to the top) of the figure provide for the linked ASes below them.
Each subfigure displays the results at one iteration.
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Algorithm: Poison Choice Heuristic
function Choose Poisons (f, t, a, n, Sources)
Input : from AS f , to AS t, adversary AS a, poison limit n, source ASes Sources
Output: poison set Poisons
Poisons = ∅
while Sources 6= ∅ and |Poisons| < n do
Setup:
B = {b | b is a bgp path t 7→ a}
Sacred = {f, t, a}+
⋃|B|
i=1Bi
Success = {s ∈ S | {f, t} ∈ s 7→ a}
Disconn = {s ∈ S | @ a specific-prefix path s 7→ a}
Sources −= Sacred ∪ Success ∪Disconn
Score poisons:
Score = [0] ∗ |Sources|
foreach si ∈ Sources do





Poisons += j 3 Scorej == max(Score)
a sends advertisement to poison Poisons
end
19
(a) Topology at start with target link 22 → 31 and adversary 60 in red.
(b) ASes prefer customer routes, shorter paths, and lower ASNs. {4, 13, 22} on link
at start; 50 marked sacred, 31 not advertised a path to 60 without it. Select 40 to
poison; most left side ASes transit it to 60.
Figure 3.1: Example Poison Scoring for Attack (1/3)
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(c) This isolates 0; 0 has no valley free path to 60 without 40. No ASes move onto
link after first poison. Most of top left now channeled through 21. Add 21 to poison
set: {40, 21}.
(d) Left side ASes on link or disconnected. Poison: 51. Poison set: {40, 21, 51}.
Figure 3.1: Example Poison Scoring for Attack(2/3)
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(e) 32 is the next poison choice. {40, 21, 51, 32}.
(f) We reach the termination condition: all ASes either transit link to adversary, or
are disconnected/sacred. 14 ASes’ traffic on target, compared to 3 initially.
Figure 3.1: Example Poison Scoring for Attack (3/3)
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3.4 Simulation Details
To evaluate Maestro, we extended the Chaos BGP simulator used in previous related
work [43, 40, 35] to run simulated attacks. This Internet-scale simulator builds a BGP
topology based on publicly available, state-of-the-art inferred AS relationship data from
CAIDA (20190201 data used) [3]. In the simulator, ASes perform a simplified BGP decision
process for path selection that includes longest-prefix matching, shortest AS PATH, and
simplified local policies. As true local AS policies are private, this is the most accurate
simulation of AS behavior we can devise; soon-to-appear work shows that real-world AS
responses to BGP poisoning generally track their simulated responses in Chaos [39].
For each attack, we use three botnet models (see Section 3.4.1) based on Mirai,
Blackenergy, and Conficker botnet IP measurements. With these models, we can measure
pre-attack flow density for a target, which we define as the percent of bot IPs with a path
to another bot IP or the adversary over the link in the inferred Internet topology. This
represents the present vulnerability of the link to a Coremelt-style Link Flooding Attack [41].
Next, we execute the Maestro Attack using the technique from the previous section in an
attempt to bring additional bot traffic to bear on the target. Finally, we measure post-attack
flow density to determine how well we steered bot-containing ASes onto the target link.
3.4.1 Botnet Models
Our botnet models are built from passive and active measurements of infected hosts from
a variety of sources. The Mirai botnet model includes more than 2 million IP addresses.
These addresses were recorded by a Chinese CDN as they attempted to spread the malware,
a process with a unique signature [31]. Our Conficker model is based on prior work
that presented a method for detecting command-and-control domain names (in essence,
rendezvous points for infected hosts) for the Conficker botnet family; the IPs in the model
were determined by monitoring bot traffic to those domains [42]. The Blackenergy model is
developed from similar techniques as presented in [6].
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3.5 Attack Samples
To evaluate the effectiveness of our algorithm as presented in Section 3.3.2, we chose
thousands of target links to attack - and adversary ASes to attack from - in an effort to
derive link vulnerability characteristics and better understand how the topological position
of target and adversary affect flow density gain. The following subsections describe our
sampling methods.
3.5.1 Link Selection
• Uniform random: Our first and most straightforward link sample set is 2000 links
selected uniformly at random from all links in our inferred topology.
• Betweenness-based: An important insight of the Crossfire attack is that degrading
links in the dense core of the Internet would create broad disruption [41]. These links
are characterized by high betweenness, where betweenness is quantified by the number
of times a link appears on paths between all ASes in the pre-attack inferred topology.
So, for our second sample set, we split all links in the CAIDA AS relationship dataset [3]
by their betweenness decile, and sample 100 links each from 1) below the 1st decile
(fringe links), 2) between the 5th and 6th decile (moderately utilized links), and above
the 9th decile (core links). This will allow us to compare the vulnerability of links to
the attack based on their path usage.
• Flow density-based: Our third and final target link set is also sampled from low,
middle, and high decile ranges, but is based on pre-attack flow-density rather than
betweenness. For each of our three botnet models, we sample 100 links each from the
low, middle, and high decile ranges. This will illustrate how effective the attack is in
both improving the flow density for links that already have some number of bots able to
direct traffic over the link and moving flows onto links that were previously unreachable
by the botmaster. These results are presented in the appendix (see Section A).
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3.5.2 Adversary Selection
We must also decide how to select the adversary ASes that will be used to issue poisoned
advertisements. Intuitively, we expect that an AS’s ability to steer traffic onto a selected
link will dissipate with increased topological distance from the link. So, we constrain
our adversary selection to ASes that are within 3 topological hops from the target, a
number chosen to be less than the average BGP path length (3.5) to convey some sense
of proximity [33]. To establish how distance affects attack success, we sample adversary
ASes from one, two, and three hops distant from the target link.
• General selection: BGP relationships are another important consideration in
selecting an adversary. We observe that the existence of valley-free paths from infected
ASes to the adversary AS over the target link - complete paths - is a necessary condition
for the attack to succeed. So, we constrain adversary selection to ASes that lie along a
valley-free path from the To AS. Also, since path export rules are different for providers,
customers, and peers (see Section 2.1), the prevalence of complete paths may be affected
by relationships. To explore these dynamics, we ensure that ASes connected to the To
AS via customers, peers, and providers (ASes in the customer, peer, and provider
regions) are represented in the sampling. Figure 3.2 shows an example sampling
respecting these considerations. Note that sampling for a customer-to-provider link
is depicted; fewer options are available for provider-to-customer targets due to BGP
path export rules. Peer links have different export rules than provider/customer links,
and are not attacked in any of the experiments in this work.
• Customer-only selection: The customer cone of an AS has the highest possible
visibility of routes exported from the AS; naturally, the AS seeks to provide its
customers with all of its known best paths in hopes of transiting customer traffic
to the maximum number of destinations. In some scenarios, we further limit adversary
selection by sampling only from the To AS customer cone. We expect that these ASes
will have the maximum number of complete paths among possible adversaries. For
a depiction of this type of sampling, see Figure 3.3. Note that this selection type
produces a subset of the adversaries selected by the other method.
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Figure 3.2: Sampling adversary ASes at random along valley free
paths from the To AS, within 3 topological hops, with adversaries
reached from To AS’s peers, customers, and providers included.
Figure 3.3: Sampling adversary ASes at random from multiple
depths (1-3) into the To AS customer cone.
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We present results for several attack scenarios in Section 4. These scenarios combine the
above listed methods for selecting target links and adversary ASes (with the exception of
the last scenario; this is a special case). The results for each experiment serve to highlight




We evaluate our attack for various link/adversary selection schemes in the following
subsections. Our success metric, in general, is flow density. Recall that flow density is
simply the percentage of bot IPs in the botnet that have a path to another bot (or the
adversary) over the target link. In most graphs, we present flow density gain, calculated via
post-attack flow density - pre-attack flow density, while in others we plot both pre- and post-
attack flow density for comparison. Link and adversary selection schemes for each scenario
are summarized in Table 4.1.
4.1 Random Link Scenario
Our first scenario consists of 2000 links selected uniformly at random from the topology. The
only links excluded from selection are 1) links with zero simulated betweenness, 2) last-mile
links to edge ASes (those with no customers) that can be hit via traditional DDoS rather
than an LFA, and 3) peer links, which are governed by different export rules as discussed in
Table 4.1: Experiments Presented
Experiment Link Selection Adversary Selection
Random Uniform random Generalized
Customer Cone Betweenness-based Customer cone
Generalized Position Betweenness-based Generalized
Infected Cone Custom (highly infected from AS cust cone) Generalized
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(a) Flow density gain distribution for targets, 3
botnets, random link selection.
(b) Pre vs post attack flow density, 3 botnets,
random link selection
Figure 4.1: Random link attack results.
Section 2.1. Adversarial selection for this scenario is performed as described in 3.5.2 under
General selection. Three adversaries are sampled at each depth 1-3 from each region (ASes
reached from customers, providers, and peers of the To AS), for a total of about 27 attackers
per link. Note that there will be fewer attackers when the To AS has a limited number of
customers/peers to sample from. The results are shown in Figure 4.1.
We make two observations about this initial experiment: first, that results from each
of our three botnet models, despite having different distributions of infected hosts in the
topology, generally exhibit similar steering behavior. This dynamic is consistent across all
of our experiments, so we will henceforth only display results for the Mirai model. Graphs
for the other botnets will be included in the appendix (see Section B) for completeness.
Second, we see that these results are frankly underwhelming. For more than 80 percent
of sampled targets, no improvement was seen in flow density after the attack, nor were there
specific cases where the attack resulted in dramatic improvement. An analysis of the few
successful cases, however, revealed some important common factors. Successful adversaries
were almost always close to the target link (confirming our suspicion that this was likely to
play a major role in moving traffic) and, interestingly, were often located in the customer
cone of the target link destination (the To AS). An AS’s customer cone consists of all ASes
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an AS can reach along customer links from itself [28]; in short, direct or indirect customers
of the AS. To further explore these trends, we narrow our adversary selection in the next
scenario to ASes in the To AS’s customer cone.
4.2 Customer Cone Scenario
This scenario examines our most privileged adversary from a positioning standpoint. In
this section, we will present results for betweenness-based link selection and customer
cone adversary selection as described in Section 3.5, with three adversaries sampled from
each depth in the To AS customer cone. The results are shown in Figure 4.2. The
adversary’s expected success in this case is dramatically improved; for direct customers of
high betweenness links, the average flow density gain is greater than 30 percent (Figure 4.2b).
Note that this figure is not percent gain relative to existing flow density - rather, an additional
30 percent of the botnet has been directed on to the link.
(a) Flow density gain distribution for links by
betweenness decile group, customer cone attack,
Mirai botnet.
(b) Heatmap of average flow density gain by ad-
versary’s topological distance from target, customer
cone attack, Mirai botnet.
Figure 4.2: Customer cone attack results.
30
For the Mirai botnet model, 30 percent flow density gain means an additional 1 million
infected hosts, on average, directing flows over the target link. Even adversary ASes located
deeper in the customer cone of the To AS can expect significant flow density improvements.
For low betweenness links, attack impact is negligible, but this is neither surprising nor
particularly interesting; these links are not primary targets for LFAs. Moderate betweenness
link vulnerability is generally low, but under certain conditions can be affected by the attack.
We plan to examine these specific cases in greater detail in future work. The pre- and
post-attack vulnerability in absolute terms of high betweenness (core) links is illustrated in
Figure 4.3. Note that the region between the curves in this figure represents the attacker’s
gain from executing the Maestro attack.
4.3 Generalized Position Results
In these experiments, we combine the betwenness-based link selection from Section 4.2 with
the more general adversary selection from Section 4.1.
Figure 4.3: Flow density pre vs post attack CDF for links above
highest betweenness decile, customer cone attack, Mirai botnet.
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Our motivation is to discover new successful scenarios with similar effect to those in
Section 4.2 where core (high betweeness) links can be significantly impacted with adversaries
positioned outside the To AS customer cone. Figure 3.2 displays our results.
Our conditions for success appear to follow the same pattern as those in the preceding
section, with low and moderate betweenness links mostly outside the range of the attack.
For links above the highest betweenness decile, we had a modest number of successful cases.
However, we examined the best (most improved flow density) cases in this experiment more
closely, and found that nearly all were produced by provider-to-customer target links as
shown in Figure 4.5.
Recall that the general adversary selection scheme used in this scenario (see Section 3.5.2)
is restricted to selecting adversaries within the To AS customer cone for provider-to-customer
links. This is because complete paths (paths from infected hosts to the adversary over the
link) must be valley-free, and transiting to a customer over the target link means that such
paths only exist for adversaries in to the To AS customer cone.
(a) Flow density gain CDF for links by betweenness
decile group, generalized attack, Mirai botnet.
(b) Heatmap of average flow density gain by adver-
sary’s topological distance from target, generalized
attack, Mirai botnet.
Figure 4.4: Generalized attack results.
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Clearly, though, attacking from the customer cone is not nearly as effective for customer-
to-provider links; every link in this experiment included adversaries sampled from the To AS
customer cone, to little effect as shown in Figure 4.5.
Still, the customer-to-provider link direction was successfully attacked in some cases. To
complete this set of experiments, we investigate the conditions under which those attacks
can significantly enhance flow density.
4.4 Infected Cone Results
As discussed in Section 2.1, we expect ASes to export routes learned from customers to all
their neighbors as a result of economic incentive. For customer-to-provider links, consider
that any bots that must transit a customer link to reach the target link should not then
transit the target link to the adversary; doing so would be a violation of valley-free routing.
Figure 4.5: Achieved flow density distribution by link relationship,
generalized attack, Mirai botnet. Violin width at a given y-value
(density) indicates proportion of attacks with that density. Note that
violin widths cannot be compared across violins.
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It follows, then, that bots must have paths that only transit customer-to-provider links
to reach the target link and still be able to transit it to the adversary. But this means that
the From AS must be able to reach these bots by transiting only provider-to-customer links;
the potential flow sources are, by definition, in the From AS customer cone.
Analyzing the few relatively successful attacks on customer-to-provider links in the
previous section indeed showed that the From AS in these cases always had an above-average
numbers of bots in their customer cones. To confirm that this is indeed the most important
factor in attacking customer-to-provider links with the Maestro attack, we randomly sampled
300 customer-to-provider target links from the set of target links whose From ASes were
above the 9th decile in total bot IP count in their customer cones. We then sampled
adversaries as in the previous section (generalized selection) and simulated attacks, producing
the results in Figure 4.6. Here we limit our definition of flow density to the portion of the
botnet present in the From AS customer cone, as these are the only infected networks we
can steer.
Our experimental results confirmed our reasoning in this case; we can often steer this
subset of the botnet to significant effect with Maestro. This presents an interesting additional
set of success conditions for the attack, as some of the largest ASes have customer cones that
cover nearly half the Internet [2].
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of gain in flow density (as pct of AS




The Coremelt [41] and Crossfire [20] attacks are discussed in detail in Section 2.3.1.
Classifying links by BGP betweenness is a technique employed by in [36]. Interestingly,
the attack from that work used the control-plane to attack the data-plane; here, we leverage
the control-plane to augment a data-plane attack. LFA mitigation work that applies to this
attack is presented in Section 6.2.
Nyx [40] and LIFEGUARD [22] employ BGP poisoning for DDoS and link failure
mitigation, respectively. In [8], poisoning is used as a technique for route discovery, and




6.1 Summary of Findings
We present a number of key takeaways from analysis of the experiments presented in
Sections 1.1 and 3.
• LFAs cannot target arbitrary links with full force in practice. Section 1.1
demonstrates that bot-to-bot (and less restrictive) LFA models are incapable of striking
any link on the Internet. In fact, even many core links can be reached by just a fraction
of infected hosts in all three botnet models.
• The Maestro attack can partially overcome these limitations. As demon-
strated in Section 4, about half of the highest betweenness (core) links in our sample
set had pre-attack Mirai flow densities of 15 percent or less; after attack execution from
the To AS customer cone, most links had 40 percent or greater achieved flow density.
• High betweenness links are much more vulnerable to this attack. All results
in Section 4 clearly indicate that highly used links are much more vulnerable to Maestro
attackers. This is an intuitive finding, but an important one, as it demonstrates that
the most critical targets can be reached by the Maestro attack.
• The most advantageous position for the Maestro attack adversary AS is
within the customer cone of the target link destination (To AS). The results
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in Section 4.2 bear this point out. A direct customer of the To AS can expect to move
fully a third of the Mirai botnet onto the target link with this attack. Importantly,
AS rank plays little role in determining success. The Pearson correlation coefficient for
flow density gain as a function of AS rank [2] is less than 0.01 for the customer cone
attack.
• Provider-to-customer targets are far more vulnerable to a Maestro attack.
Figure 4.5 shows how stark the differences are between provider-to-customer and
customer-to-provider targets.
• Customer-to-provider targets are vulnerable when link source endpoint
(From ASes) has significantly infected customer cone. While customer-to-
provider links are not vulnerable in general, this is an important exception. Future
work will explore how this result relates to peer links, which commonly link large
transit ASes.
6.2 Mitigation
There are two broad categories of mitigations that apply to our attack. The first are general
Link Flooding Attack solutions. Unfortunately, state-of-the-art countermeasures are not
widely available to network operators because they require either collaboration between ASes
not properly incentivized to collaborate [4, 24] or infrastructure capabilities not deployed in
practice [19, 26]. The solution presented in [40] could partially mitigate the attack by moving
traffic from a critical AS to the deploying AS off the attacked link, but the link would still
be affected for all other source/destination AS pairings utilizing the link.
The second and more relevant category of mitigations target the poisoned route
advertisements that serve as the primary primitive for Maestro attacks. Route Origin
Authorization would not affect this attack, as the compromised AS owns the advertised
destination prefixes [25]. BGPSEC, if widely deployed, could prevent this kind of AS PATH
tampering; unfortunately, it is not deployed at scale [13].
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Detecting or filtering advertisements by individual network operators is the most
straightforward approach to countering a Maestro attack. However, some proposed DDoS
mitigation [40] and link failure response [22] systems rely on BGP poisoning, and network
operators have used it to control path propagation for traffic engineering [34]. Filtering
all BGP poisons, then, may have some cost, and finer-grained responses (including careful
monitoring of downstream advertisements) may be more appropriate.
6.3 Future Work
A number of avenues for future work exists for this attack. The core algorithm, poison
scoring, is a simple first technique with many opportunities for improvement. The current
version weighs all ASes equally when making poisoning decisions; infected hosts, on the
other hand, are not uniformly distributed throughout the Internet topology. Some method
of weighing poisoning decisions could therefore enhance the performance of the algorithm.
We currently limit our adversary AS to a single poisoned prefix when making advertise-
ments; in practice, a compromised AS may have many prefixes to choose from, meaning that
source ASes with conflicting poison sets could be assigned to different prefixes when making
advertisements. Alternatively, after the initial simple algorithm generates an approximation
to the large poisoning problem, an optimal solution for the smaller remaining disconnected
AS set could be found via a MAX SAT solver. Finally, with multiple prefixes, the Maestro
attack could be trivially extended to attacking multiple links for a more sophisticated,
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A Results for Flow Density-Based Link Sampling
In this section we present results that mirror Scenario 2 and 3 in Section 4 in design and
execution, but where links are sampled by flow density decile rather than betweenness decile.
A.1 Customer Cone
(a) Flow density gain CDF for links by flow density
decile group, customer cone attack, Mirai botnet.
(b) Heatmap of average flow density gain by ad-
versary’s topological distance from target, customer
cone attack, Mirai botnet.
Figure A.1: Customer cone attack results, flow density decile sampling.
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Figure A.2: Flow density pre vs post attack CDF for links above
highest flow density decile, customer cone attack, Mirai botnet.
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A.2 Generalized
(a) Flow density gain CDF for links by flow density
decile group, generalized attack, Mirai botnet.
(b) Heatmap of average flow density gain by adver-
sary’s topological distance from target, generalized
attack, Mirai botnet.
Figure A.3: Generalized attack results.
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Figure A.4: Flow density pre vs post attack CDF for links above
highest flow density decile, generalized attack, Mirai botnet.
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B Results for Other Botnet Models
Virtually all of the results presented in Section 4 were for attacks executed with the Mirai
botnet model. In general, data from attacks utilizing our other two botnet models - Conficker
and Blackenergy - exhibited the same patterns as those found in the Mirai results. Here we
present betweenness-based sampling results for those models for completeness.
B.1 Conficker
Customer Cone
(a) Flow density gain CDF for links by betweenness
decile group, customer cone attack, Conficker
botnet.
(b) Heatmap of average flow density gain by ad-
versary’s topological distance from target, customer
cone attack, Conficker botnet.
Figure B.1: Customer cone attack results, betwenness decile sampling (Conficker).
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Generalized
(a) Flow density gain CDF for links by betweenness
decile group, generalized attack, Conficker botnet.
(b) Heatmap of average flow density gain by adver-
sary’s topological distance from target, generalized
attack, Mirai botnet.




(a) Flow density gain CDF for links by betweenness
decile group, customer cone attack, Blackenergy
botnet.
(b) Heatmap of average flow density gain by ad-
versary’s topological distance from target, customer
cone attack, Blackenergy botnet.
Figure B.3: Customer cone attack results, betwenness decile sampling (Blackenergy).
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Generalized
(a) Flow density gain CDF for links by between-
ness decile group, generalized attack, Blackenergy
botnet.
(b) Heatmap of average flow density gain by adver-
sary’s topological distance from target, generalized
attack, Blackenergy botnet.
Figure B.4: Generalized attack results (Blackenergy).
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